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INTRODUCTION
It is a priority of the United States to
[h]elp partner countries strengthen governance and
transparency, break the corruptive power of transnational
criminal networks, and sever state–crime alliances. The
United States needs willing, reliable and capable partners to
combat the corruption and instability generated by TOC
[Transnational Organized Crime] and related threats to
governance. We will help international partners develop the
sustainable capacities necessary to defeat transnational
threats; strengthen legitimate and effective public safety,
security, and justice institutions; and promote universal
values. We will also seek to sever the powerful strategic
alliances that form between TOC and states, including those
between TOC networks and foreign intelligence services.1
This official statement of the U.S. government’s strategy toward
transnational organized crime recognizes a developing phenomenon: the
maturation of criminal networks that increasingly know no boundaries.
From narcotics trafficking to money laundering to human smuggling and
cybercrime, increasingly sophisticated criminal organizations transcend
national frontiers effortlessly, destabilize business and state infrastructures,
and leave countless victims in their wake.
If nation–states are to keep pace with criminal networks, they must
transcend their own frontiers. The more individual nations—particularly
smaller countries in the immediate path of these criminal networks—are
boxed in by fixed notions of sovereignty, the more they stand to lose.
Sophisticated criminals do not hesitate to cross boundaries, build
transborder alliances, or nimbly change their patterns in response to law
enforcement efforts. If nations cannot keep up, the criminal networks will
(and do) run circles around them.
1. WHITE HOUSE, STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: ADDRESSING
CONVERGING THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 13 (July 19, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/microsites/2011-strategy-combat-transnational-organized-crime.pdf.
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In recognition of this dynamic, U.S. federal law increasingly blurs the
boundaries between criminal conduct committed in the territorial United
States and conduct committed abroad that impacts the United States.
Increasingly, foreign nationals are held to account for violations of U.S.
federal laws “for conduct committed entirely beyond the territorial limits of
the United States that nevertheless has effects in this country.”2 As Justice
William Brennan recognized over twenty years ago, “[f]oreign nationals
must now take care not to violate our drug laws, our antitrust laws, our
securities laws, and a host of other federal criminal statutes.”3 The number
of statutes with extraterritorial jurisdiction continues to increase as
Congress tries to bridge the gap between criminal conduct committed
abroad and the disastrous effects felt within the United States.4
2. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279–80 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
3. Id. at 280 (footnotes omitted).
4. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International Enforcement
of Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 37, 37–38 (1990) (“Each year new laws are enacted and old
ones amended to expand the United States government’s ability to police crimes such as drug
trafficking, high tech smuggling, and terrorist activity.”). A partial list of extraterritorial statutes is
included here to provide some context for the breadth of conduct that can occur outside the United
States yet still be punished inside the United States. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 351(i) (2006) (providing
extraterritorial jurisdiction over congressional, Cabinet, and Supreme Court assassinations,
kidnappings, and assaults); id. § 470 (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over counterfeit acts);
id. § 956 (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over conspiracies to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure
persons or damage property in a foreign country); id. § 1116(c) (providing extraterritorial
jurisdiction over the murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally
protected persons); id. § 1119 (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over the foreign murder of a
U.S. national by a U.S. national); id. § 1201 (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over kidnapping
in certain circumstances); id. § 1203 (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over hostage taking); id.
§ 1204 (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over the kidnapping of a minor by his or her parent);
id. § 1512(h) (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over tampering with a witness, victim, or
informant); id. § 2261 (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over domestic violence); id. § 2261A
(providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over stalking); id. § 2422 (providing extraterritorial
jurisdiction over coercion and enticement); id. § 3271 (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over
trafficking in persons committed by persons employed by or accompanying the federal government
outside the United States). It should be noted however that the precise language in the preceding
statutes may limit extraterritorial jurisdiction.
There are also a significant number of crimes that are applicable extraterritorially by inference
irrespective of location. See, e.g., id. § 111 (criminalizing assault, resisting, or impeding certain
officers or employees); id. § 495 (criminalizing forgery of written documents for the purpose of
obtaining money from the U.S. Government); id. § 499 (criminalizing the forgery of U.S. military
documents); id. § 112(e) (criminalizing certain crimes against foreign officials, official guests, and
internationally protected persons); id. § 115 (criminalizing influencing, impeding, or retaliating
against a federal official by threatening or injuring a family member); id. § 371 (criminalizing
conspiracy to commit an offense against or defraud the U.S. government).
Likewise, the United States exercises jurisdiction over crimes committed in the Special
Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction (SMTJ)—a specific category of domestic and extraterritorial
jurisdiction defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). There are nine subcategories of SMTJ, each described
in its own subsection. These are, in brief:
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Despite the extraterritorial reach of U.S. statutes, the reach of U.S. law
enforcement is not so long. In fact, U.S. law enforcement is, by and large,
entirely dependent on foreign law enforcement partners to secure the
evidence needed to prosecute cases in U.S. federal court. Because U.S. law
enforcement agents are limited in their ability to act outside of the
jurisdictional limits of the United States, partnering with foreign
governments is the primary method by which U.S. law enforcement can
meaningfully dismantle these criminal organizations.
(1) The high seas . . . and any vessel belonging . . . to the United States or any
citizen thereof, or to any corporation [thereof] . . . when such vessel is within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction
of any particular State.
(2) Any [U.S.-registered or enrolled vessels] upon . . . the Great Lakes, or . . . the
waters connecting them, or upon the Saint Lawrence River where the same
constitutes the International Boundary Line.
(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States . . . for the
erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.
(4) [Guano islands].
(5) Any aircraft belonging . . . to the United States, or any citizen thereof, or to
any corporation [thereof] . . . while such aircraft is in flight over the high seas, or
over any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.
(6) [U.S. registered space vehicles] from the moment when all external doors are
closed on Earth . . . .
(7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by
or against a national of the United States.
(8) . . . any foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or
arrival in the United States with respect to an offense committed by or against a
national of the United States.
(9) With respect to offenses committed by or against a national of the United
States . . .
(A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other
United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including the
buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant . . . thereto or used for
purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of ownership; and
(B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant . . . thereto,
irrespective of ownership, used for purposes of those missions or entities or
used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or entities.
Id. § 7.
Unlike other extraterritorial statutes and the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, SMTJ
applies only if the substantive statute expressly states that it applies within the SMTJ. Such statutes
include 18 U.S.C. § 113 (2006) (assault), 18 U.S.C. § 114 (maiming), 18 U.S.C. § 661 (theft), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1111–1113 (homicide and attempted homicide), 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (kidnapping), 18
U.S.C. § 1363 (property damage), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2244 (sexual abuse). Special thanks are
given to the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section of the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice for providing guidance on this list. A more complete list of crimes with
extraterritorial jurisdiction can be found at CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-166,
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 40–63 (2012).
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The ways in which U.S. law enforcement agencies form these
partnerships are significant. U.S. government actors increasingly share
information with foreign partners. Foreign partners also work in U.S.
intelligence and law enforcement centers. Moreover, U.S. government
agents are physically on the ground working hand in hand with foreign law
enforcement—either in an advisory- or capacity-building role; in some
cases, U.S. government actors are cross-designated to perform law
enforcement functions in foreign government jurisdictions.
Law enforcement agents of many nations welcome the exciting
possibilities for cross-border cooperation. But these partnerships raise a
host of legal and policy concerns that we cannot ignore, particularly as it
relates to the collection of evidence and information on which a case is
built.
The purpose of this Article is to revisit the jurisprudence on the Fourth
Amendment’s application to extraterritorial searches in which the fruits of
seizures are introduced in U.S. courts to prosecute defendants who violate
U.S. federal statutes. The Supreme Court has not opined on this issue since
1990,5 and the time for review is ripe.
This Article suggests that as our criminal laws and powers of
enforcement continue to stretch, so, too, should the Fourth Amendment to
include any defendant tried in a U.S. court for violating U.S. law. This idea
goes beyond the conclusions drawn by courts and scholars who considered
the issue before, and focuses not on the source of the evidence or on the
characteristics of the defendant, but on how the evidence is used,
particularly how it may be used to extend the reach of the law enforcement
arm of the United States.6 To get there, this Article first reviews the
development of the Fourth Amendment as it is applied to partnerships
between federal and state law enforcement. It then revisits the Supreme
5. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259.
6. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 223 (1960)) (noting that “all evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure
[is] inadmissible in a federal court regardless of its source”); Kif Augustine Adams, Recent
Development, Foreigners, Foreign Property, and the Fourth Amendment: United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990), 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1037, 1040 (1990)
(analyzing what constitutes a “substantial connection” sufficient to establish Fourth Amendment
protections); Eric Bentley, Jr., Toward an International Fourth Amendment: Rethinking Searches
and Seizures Abroad After Verdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 329, 334 (1994)
(suggesting two alternative transnational approaches for determining the “reasonableness” of
extraterritorial searches); Randall K. Miller, The Limits of U.S. International Law Enforcement
After Verdugo-Urquidez: Resurrecting Rochin, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 867, 883 (1997) (suggesting
that the constitutional protections cannot apply to someone who is involuntarily brought to the
United States to face trial); Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, Coordinated Criminal
Investigations Between the United States and Foreign Governments and Their Implications for
American Constitutional Rights, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 821, 823 (2002) (advocating for broader
understanding of a joint venture analysis, but without taking on the question of who is protected
from an unreasonable search).
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Court’s 1990 conclusion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,7 and
questions whether its premise—that the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to a foreign national defendant who is not a legal permanent resident or
otherwise “substantially” connected to the United States—still holds in
light of the evolution of crime and law enforcement methods. It rejects
analysis that the Fourth Amendment applies only at the time of the search
itself,8 as opposed to any further use by the government to deprive
individuals of their liberty, and embraces a similar assessment conducted
by the Supreme Court as federal and state law enforcement partnerships
deepened in response to increasingly multi-jurisdictional crimes in the
1940s.9 Ultimately, this Article suggests that we should recommit to the
case law from the mid-twentieth century in which the Court concluded that
ensuring respect for the Fourth Amendment protection of privacy was so
basic to our free society that it is protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution.
The impact of this approach is to teach by doing: to raise the standards
of foreign partners where there is inconsistent respect for human rights and
civil liberties, and to significantly diminish the likelihood that U.S. law
enforcement will operate with unclean hands or benefit from the
questionable practices of foreign law enforcement. Ultimately, this
approach will promote the greatest respect for human rights and civil
liberties in the United States and abroad.
I. JOINT VENTURES
A. Application of “Joint Venture” Analysis in
Federal–State Partnerships
In general, the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures,” prohibits the government from
exercising the authority to search a private individual’s person or home
without first obtaining a warrant from a neutral magistrate, except in
certain limited circumstances.10 Since 1886, the federal courts considered
7. 494 U.S. 259.
8. See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law—The
International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators from
Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 874, 880 (2003).
9. See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution
and International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 444 (1990) (contending that U.S. law
enforcement should be similarly restrained when law enforcement officials act abroad as they are
when they act domestically, but declining to address whether courts should similarly exclude
evidence obtained unreasonably).
10. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
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exclusion of evidence as a remedy to an unreasonable search and seizure
by federal agents.11 In 1914, in Weeks v. United States,12 the Court
articulated that, because the “effect of the Fourth Amendment” is to
“limit[]” and “restrain[]” federal actors “as to the exercise of such power
and authority,”13 exclusion is the “only viable remedy available for Fourth
Amendment violations.”14
Despite its recognition that the Fourth Amendment could not be
effectuated without the remedy of exclusion, the impact of the Court’s
decisions was limited by its holding that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to the states.15 As a result, evidence that would have been found
unreasonably obtained and excluded if seized by federal officers, was not
excluded if state actors gathered it—even when used in a federal
prosecution.16 Courts recognized the undesirable behavior this position
potentially fostered and tried to devise a formula that removed the
incentive for federal law enforcement officers to shift duties for gathering
evidence to state officers. In so doing, courts created the concept of the
“joint venture.”17 If the federal and state law enforcement actors were
engaged in a joint venture, then the Fourth Amendment would apply to
evidence introduced in a U.S. federal court.18 The operative question for
federal judges in analyzing state–federal partnerships during this time was
what motivated the officer’s actions. If the state officer acted to enforce
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886), abrogated on other grounds by
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); see also Mark E. Cammack, The Rise
and Fall of the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP.
631, 649 (2010) (noting that exclusion of involuntary confessions dates back to the common law of
evidence); Tom Quigley, Do Silver Platters Have a Place in State-Federal Relations? Using
Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 285, 285 (1988).
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
13. Id. at 391–92.
14. Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption, and Illegitimacy: Why Judicial Integrity
Justifies the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 419, 423 (2013); see also Weeks, 232 U.S.
at 393 (“If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be
secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”).
15. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398 (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not directed at the conduct
of local police officers).
16. See, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927), abrogated by Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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state laws, then there was no joint venture, just a happy coincidence. But,
where the federal officers adopt a prosecution originated by
state officers as the result of a search made by them, the same
rule as to the admissibility of evidence obtained in the course
of the search should be applied as if it were made by the
federal officers themselves or under their direction.19
Under such circumstances, if “the federal authorities use the evidence in a
federal prosecution, they become subject to all the limitations of the
Federal Constitution, regardless of whether state prosecutors might be
similarly limited by the State Constitution.”20
It was not until Wolf v. Colorado,21 in 1949, that the Court extended the
reach of the Fourth Amendment to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 There, the Court recognized that
“[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society”
and therefore “enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause.”23 “The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude
to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the
police” should be “condemned as inconsistent with the conception of
human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional
documents of English-speaking peoples.”24 In so holding, the Court wiped
away the distinction between federal and state law enforcement actors. The
key issue was the impact of the government intrusion on the individual’s
liberty and the most significant harm attached at the time the defendant
was faced with the illegally seized evidence at trial.25
Despite its recognition that state police action was not materially
different in effect from federal police action, the Court found that the Due
Process Clause did not similarly require states to adopt the exclusionary
rule, noting that “the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of
a different order.”26 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, concluded
that the states may have methods for enforcing Fourth Amendment
protections that are sufficiently effective to satisfy the Due Process
Clause.27
Thus, whether to exclude the evidence because of a federal violation of
19. Sutherland v. United States, 92 F.2d 305, 307 (4th Cir. 1937).
20. Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172, 173 (2d Cir. 1928) (citing Gambino v. United
States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927)).
21. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. Id. at 27–28.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 41–42 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 28 (majority opinion).
27. Id. at 31.
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the Fourth Amendment remained a question for the trial courts. Because
courts continued to treat evidence gathered by state actors differently than
evidence gathered by federal actors, this practice required courts to still
examine the extent of the role played by the federal government in
gathering evidence when admitting it.28 Arguably, there would be some
remedy if state actors violated the right to privacy and then sought to use
the evidence in a U.S. federal court.29 At the very least, courts expanded
their view as to what constituted a joint venture. Justice Frankfurter coined
a new phrase and summarized the joint venture doctrine: “[A] search is a
search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a
federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the
federal authorities on a silver platter.”30
In Elkins v. United States,31 the Court finally put a stake through the
heart of the “silver platter doctrine” by extending the exclusionary rule to
evidence gathered by state as well as federal investigators.32 Recognizing
the dissonance in its earlier positions—that exclusion was the only viable
remedy to preserve the protections of the Fourth Amendment33 but that the
Due Process Clause did not compel its use by the states34—the Court
finally connected the dots. If government actors violate this basic right of
security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion, then government
actors should not benefit from this violation and exclusion is the correct
remedy.35
Importantly, in reaching this conclusion, Elkins flipped the Fourth
Amendment question on its head. Rather than look to the badge of the
individual effecting the search, the Elkins Court attached the right to
privacy more firmly to the victim: “To the victim it matters not whether his
constitutional right has been invaded by a federal agent or by a state
officer.”36 As cited by the Elkins majority, past practice reflected a “basic
incongruity” recognized by Justice (then-Judge) Cardozo, specifically that
a federal prosecutor could not benefit from evidence collected through the
trespass of a federal officer, but did “not have to be so scrupulous about

28. Much as they previously did under the joint venture doctrine.
29. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102 n.10 (1957) (“It has remained an open
question in this Court whether evidence obtained solely by state agents in an illegal search may be
admissible in federal court despite the Fourth Amendment.”).
30. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1949) (emphasis added); see also Quigley,
supra note 11, at 286.
31. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
32. Id. at 208, 223.
33. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914), overruled by Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
35. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223.
36. Id. at 215.
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evidence brought to him by others.”37 Such an inconsistent approach did
not align with the tenets enshrined in the Constitution.
Likewise important, in reaching its conclusion, Elkins recognized the
significance of the use of the evidence in effectuating a violation of the
Constitution and the role the state actor played beyond the initial seizure.
The key issue was not at all limited to who collected the evidence, but
rather to how the federal prosecutor could benefit from it38 and how courts
would exercise their supervisory power over the administration of justice
when choosing whether to admit it.39 The role played by each of these
government actors featured in the Court’s determination of whether the
right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures
had been violated.
B. Application of “Joint Venture” Analysis in
Federal–Foreign Partnerships
The state of the law that governs the admission of evidence collected by
foreign officers and used in U.S. federal court by U.S. federal prosecutors
is analogous to the law predating Elkins. Courts generally find that the
Fourth Amendment—and the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures—does not apply outside the United States regardless
of whether the person searched is a U.S. citizen.40 As a result, evidence
that courts would exclude if seized by federal officers does not offend the
Constitution if foreign actors gather it—even when used in a federal
prosecution.41 As U.S. law enforcement agents increasingly partner with
foreign law enforcement agents, however, courts have resurrected the joint
venture doctrine from its mid-twentieth century grave. Thus, much like the
pre-Elkins days, if a U.S. government agent substantially participates in a
foreign investigation or surveillance of a U.S. person, then the court may
deem the action to be a joint venture between the two nations and will
apply a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard to any resulting
searches of the U.S. person.42
There are two key differences between application of the joint venture
analysis in these situations as compared to the analysis applied pre-Elkins
to federal–state investigations. First, if the court finds a joint venture,
foreign law governs the question of whether the search is reasonable, rather
than U.S. law.43 If the government actor conducts the search in a manner
37. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (N.Y. 1926).
38. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 215 & n.7.
39. Id. at 216.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978).
41. See, e.g., id. at 1361–62.
42. See, e.g., id. at 1362; United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762, 1998 WL 42261, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1998).
43. United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 968 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Peterson, 812
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consistent with foreign law, a reviewing court will presume it to be
reasonable.44 Even where the search is inconsistent with foreign law, as
long as U.S. agents reasonably relied on foreign officials’ representations
of foreign law, a court will uphold the search under the “good faith
exception” to the exclusionary rule.45
Second, unlike the federal–state partnerships of the early twentieth
century, courts that examine evidence from federal–foreign law
enforcement partnerships are far less likely to find a joint venture, and
therefore never reach the reasonableness inquiry of the search and seizure
at all.46 Rather than asking whether the U.S. officer had a hand in the
search, courts undergo a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the U.S. officer
directed the actions of the foreign officer.47 For example, the mere
presence and observation of foreign law enforcement by U.S. agents at the
time of the search, seizure, surveillance, or interrogation generally is not
enough to trigger a joint venture inquiry, even if federal prosecutors later
introduce the resulting evidence in a U.S. trial.48 Likewise, providing
money, information on targets, wiretapping equipment, and interpretation
services, are usually insufficient to trigger a joint venture inquiry if U.S.
agents merely hoped that the foreign government would take additional
action but did not direct them to do so.49 Similarly, benefiting from the
F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1986).
44. Whether it is appropriate to import the standards of the foreign country when determining
the “reasonableness” of the search and seizure is a different subject to be explored another day.
45. Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491–92 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)); see
also Juda, 46 F.3d at 968 (finding that a DEA agent reasonably relied on representations by
Australian officials that no warrant was required under Australian law to place transmitter on vessel
in Australian port); Kristopher A. Nelson, Note, Transnational Wiretaps and the Fourth
Amendment, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329, 345 (2009) (outlining a three-part inquiry:
(1) substantial participation; (2) done in keeping with foreign law; and (3) based on a reasonable
belief that the foreign search complied with the foreign country’s law); Caitlin T. Street, Note,
Streaming the International Silver Platter Doctrine: Coordinating Transnational Law Enforcement
in the Age of Global Terrorism and Technology, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 411, 433–34 (2011)
(same).
46. See Robert L. King, Note, The International Silver Platter and the ‘Shocks the
Conscience’ Test: U.S. Law Enforcement Overseas, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 489, 511 (1989) (arguing that
“federal courts, without acknowledgment, are applying the fourth amendment [sic] only when the
United States actually seizes evidence during a foreign search or when U.S. conduct makes the
foreign seizure possible”).
47. See id. at 494–505.
48. See United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 270 (7th Cir. 1976) (“FBI agents were
present with Superintendent Tricker at various times during his investigation and search, but there is
no evidence that they took an active part in interrogating or searching the suspects or in selecting
evidence to seize. Mere presence of federal officers is not sufficient to make the officers
participants.”), abrogated on other grounds by Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
49. See United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1992) (agreeing that there was no
joint venture where “the DEA requested background information on the Turkish telephone
numbers, with the hope that the [Turkish National Police] would wiretap the numbers” even though
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information gleaned from an interview by foreign officers familiar with
U.S. investigations is not sufficient to establish a joint venture, as long as
the U.S. agents do not “actively participate” or direct the interview.50
On the other hand, courts generally find a joint venture where there is
evidence of a sustained and regular interaction between foreign and U.S.
law enforcement and where there is evidence that the United States
directed or participated in the search. For example, handling evidence,
participating in the arrest or surveillance of defendants, and providing
money or supplies triggered a joint venture in one case.51 This
determination is undercut, however, if the U.S. court finds that the foreign
government had its own reasons to conduct the investigation independent
of U.S. direction or was already investigating the subject prior to U.S.
involvement. That foreign law enforcement “might also have intended to
help the United States” is not a sufficient reason to attribute foreign law
enforcement conduct to U.S. agents.52 Because individual trial courts make
case-by-case determinations of whether the conduct established a joint
venture, it is difficult to glean any hard and fast rules from an analysis of
the case law, much less frame it the way the silver platter doctrine
intended.53
DEA agents also helped to translate intercepted calls); United States v. Trenary, 473 F.2d 680, 681–
82 (9th Cir. 1973) (agreeing that there was no joint venture where a U.S. customs officer acted
solely as an interpreter upon the request of the Mexican police and did not identify himself as a U.S.
government official); cf. Kilday v. United States, 481 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1973) (agreeing that a
court should deny habeas corpus relief where a person from the American consulate acted solely as
an interpreter during interrogation by Argentinian police).
50. See United States v. Lopez-Imitola, No. 03 Cr. 294, 2004 WL 2534153, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 5, 2004) (holding there was no joint venture because U.S. agents did not “actively participate”
in the interview and neither asked foreign authorities to question the defendant nor provided any
questions to ask the defendant).
51. See United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding a joint venture
where DEA agents alerted the Mexican police of the possible activity, coordinated surveillance,
supplied the pilot for the plane, and gave the signal that instigated the arrest); see also United States
v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding a joint venture where U.S. agents requested
wiretaps, the information obtained was immediately forwarded to them, and interpretation was
provided throughout the surveillance).
52. Marzano, 537 F.2d at 271.
53. Noticeably absent from this inquiry is whether the results of an unreasonable search led to
action in a U.S. court and whether it was appropriate for a U.S. court or a U.S. jury to rely on
evidence from a questionable provenance. In fact, in all of these cases cited, the evidence seized
during the foreign investigations was shared with American authorities for use in U.S.
investigations and prosecutions. In most of them, the foreign officers did not hand the U.S. federal
officers information neatly packaged on a silver platter. U.S. law enforcement was involved in some
form or fashion. And unless the court finds a joint venture or allegations of conscience-shocking
behavior, U.S. district courts make no inquiry into the methods by which the evidence was
gathered. See United States v. Callaway, 446 F.2d 753, 755 (3d Cir. 1971) (finding that where
searches occurring in a foreign country were conducted by foreign law enforcement officials who
were not acting in connection, or cooperation, with American law enforcement authorities, and
where the actions of the foreign officials were not so outrageous as to shock the conscience of the
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As seen in the days predating Wolf and Elkins, there are multiple
problems with the current approach used to analyze extraterritorial
searches: (1) the current approach is inconsistent and fails to provide
sufficiently bright lines for law enforcement who want to protect their
investigations; (2) the current approach is not sustainable as sovereign
governments increasingly focus on common targets and as informal and
formal networks of prosecutors and law enforcement continue to mature;
and (3) the current approach risks that U.S. courts will turn a blind eye to
behavior that undermines our foundational constitutional commitments to
justice and fairness.
C. Condemned to Repeat the Past: Reasons to Rethink Our Current
Understanding of “Joint Ventures”
1. Blurry Lines Result in Inconsistent Outcomes and
Jeopardize Investigations
Because courts employ a case-by-case analysis to determine the
existence of a joint venture, the result is a loose set of guidelines applied in
different ways by different courts.54 What complicates this highly factspecific inquiry is that the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue in
the context of federal–foreign partnerships.55 In the absence of clear
guidance, courts adopt a “much more stringent standard for finding the
federalization of an international investigation” than the federalization of a
state investigation.56
court, the fact that the searches were not based on probable cause was of no consequence).
54. For example, providing interpretation services alone is probably not enough to create a
joint venture, but one indicium thereof. See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1094 (reasoning that the provision
of translation services is one of several factors that demonstrates the existence of a joint venture,
especially where U.S. agents requested a wiretap); Maturo, 982 F.2d at 61; Emery, 591 F.2d at
1268 (finding a joint venture where “D.E.A. agents alerted the Mexican police of the possible
activity, coordinated the surveillance at the . . . airport, supplied the pilot for the plane and gave the
signal that instigated the arrest,” and distinguishing Trenary, 473 F.2d 680, “where the agent merely
acted as an interpreter”); Trenary, 473 F.2d at 681–82 (“The arrest and detention in Mexico was not
a joint venture; [the U.S. customs officer] was not acting as an American agent but only as an
interpreter.” (emphasis added)).
55. The issue is further complicated “by the fact that some constitutional guarantees apply
differently abroad than they do domestically.” Nathan & Man, supra note 6, at 822. The courts also
apply a different analysis in cases involving the Fifth and Sixth Amendments than they do in the
Fourth Amendment context. Id. at 823–24.
56. Id. at 832 (noting that the Supreme Court held that a “search is a search by a federal
official if he had a hand in it” or where “federal agents had participated” (quoting Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74, 76 (1949)). Nathan and Man argue that, because the lower courts have not
articulated the same standard when examining a federal–foreign joint venture as the courts
previously had when examining federal–state joint ventures, there is an inconsistency in the courts’
treatment of the issue. Id. at 832 & nn.43–44. This may be a stretch given that the Supreme Court
articulated this “participation” test only in the context of federal–state joint ventures. The Supreme
Court never took the opportunity to articulate whether the earlier joint venture doctrine extends
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There are multiple dangers inherent in relying on this “I know it when I
see it” approach, particularly in the area of criminal law. Foremost among
these dangers is the uncertainty courts are unwittingly introducing into the
ability of law enforcement to act effectively and efficiently. “A highly
sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and
requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be
the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges
eagerly feed,” but are impractical for the officer in the field to apply.57 The
security that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect “can only be
realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most
instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as
to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law
enforcement.”58 Particularly given the “limited time and expertise to reflect
on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances [police officers] confront,” a single, familiar standard is
essential.59 By and large, law enforcement officers are more than willing
and capable of operating within established guidelines. The key is that they
know the scope of these guidelines. Given this preference for bright-line
rules, the current joint venture analysis practically begs for reconsideration.
2. It Is Not Sustainable
The United States’ prior experience with the joint venture analyses is
instructive. After thirty-five years of applying the doctrine, and as the
number of federal–state partnerships increased, it became clear that this
“bright-line rule” was neither very bright nor a true hard-and-fast rule.
“That such a rule would engender practical difficulties in an era of
expanding federal criminal jurisdiction could not, perhaps, have been
foreseen.”60 But there, as here with international investigations, the
difficulties in parsing out which conduct violated the rule and which did
not led to the familiar situation where “federal courts did not find
themselves in complete harmony, nor even internally self-consistent.”61
We are well past the point articulated in Elkins with respect to U.S.–
foreign investigations. In the past few years, the number of joint
fully to federal–foreign partnerships and, for a variety of reasons, courts treat federal–foreign
partnerships as a different animal. That distinction is easily forgotten as courts otherwise import—
but resist applying—much of the language from these early twentieth century federal–state cases
when they look at federal–foreign partnerships; the courts are unable to complete the analogy.
Nathan and Man argue that this resistance is a mistake. Id. at 834–36.
57. Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”:
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141, cited in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
458 (1981).
58. Id. at 142.
59. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979).
60. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 211 (1960).
61. Id. at 212.
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investigations only continued to expand. The United States has over sixty
mutual legal assistance treaties in force.62 These bilateral agreements
provide a formal mechanism for two countries to gather and exchange
evidence and information to enforce public or criminal laws.63 Likewise,
growing numbers of federal civilian law enforcement agencies are
assigning increasing numbers of personnel overseas, a fact that suggests
informal methods of investigating cases and sharing information and
evidence will only increase.64
The U.S. federal–foreign law enforcement situation ultimately will
become more difficult than the situation witnessed at the time of the Elkins
decision. Unlike federal–state partnerships, U.S. federal law enforcement
agents are particularly dependent on their foreign law enforcement partners
to enforce U.S. statutes with extraterritorial implications. They have no
authority to conduct investigations, arrests, or seizures on their own
beyond U.S. territorial limits. “Sovereignty requires that most international
law enforcement efforts be bilateral, cooperative ventures.”65 As the United
States increases the number of statutes with extraterritorial jurisdiction, it
is driven to ever more cooperation with foreign law enforcement. It is
inevitable that the path will continue to be muddied as nation-states work
ever more closely together.
62. See generally MICHAEL ABBELL, OBTAINING EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CRIMINAL CASES 2010,
at 145–204 (2010). Jurisdictions with which the United States has a bilateral mutual legal assistance
treaty in force include Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados,
Belgium, Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Hong
Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, the
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom (including the Cayman Islands,
Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands), Uruguay, and
Venezuela. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2012 (2012),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202293.pdf.
63. See ETHAN NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS 315–28 (1993) (discussing legal
assistance treaties generally and American efforts to negotiate such a treaty with Switzerland).
64. For example, the FBI has legal attaché offices and smaller sub-offices in over seventy-six
key cities around the globe. These offices provide coverage for more than 200 countries, territories,
and islands. International Operations, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/international_operations (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). The DEA has eighty-six foreign offices in
sixty-seven countries, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Foreign Office Locations, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/about/foreignoffices.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2013), and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement has seventy-five offices in forty-eight foreign countries around the
world. International Affairs, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/
offices/homeland-security-investigations/oia (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
65. Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 41 (noting also that “[t]he sovereign power of states
forecloses unilateral police action by one state in the territory of another”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 6

1932

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

In a federal–state investigation, by contrast, the federal government
retains broad powers to conduct its own investigation, regardless of the
state in which the criminal conduct occurs. It may choose to rely on state or
local law enforcement as a force multiplier, but it is by no means required
to do so. On the other hand, the United States has little power to directly
enforce its extraterritorial laws beyond its borders.
3. Current Joint Venture Analysis Undermines Our Constitutional
Commitments to Justice and Fairness
Courts acknowledge that the purpose of the joint venture analysis is to
ensure that U.S. law enforcement agents do not use the participation of
foreign governments as a mechanism to violate the Constitution by
“circuitous and indirect methods.”66 But, as the Court observed in Elkins,
application of a more lenient standard in one scenario will inevitably tempt
law enforcement to “at least tacitly . . . encourage state officers in the
disregard of constitutionally protected freedom.”67
There is no reason to think that the situation will play out any
differently in the international arena. In fact, because courts now employ a
much narrower lens when determining the existence of a “joint venture” in
a foreign–federal partnership,68 the potential for disregard of constitutional
rights has grown. Under the existing framework, U.S. law enforcement
agents can provide a great deal of guidance to foreign law enforcement
agencies and benefit from a great deal of information before they ever
cross the line into a “joint venture.”69 As long as they manage to stay on
the right side of it, U.S. agents’ power to obtain evidence without the
cumbersome requirements of our Fourth Amendment is quite broad.70
This dynamic will become more stark as law enforcement officers
increasingly work side by side with their foreign counterparts; case law
suggests that as long as the foreign law enforcement agency makes its own
decisions, or shares a common criminal target with the United States, it
could essentially turn over all of its evidence to the United States for
prosecution in the United States without any serious inquiry into the
methods used to gather this evidence. This practice is not as far-fetched as
it may sound. Particularly in countries plagued by corruption or struggling
with the existence of dysfunctional courts, foreign investigators have an
66. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting);
Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1968); cf. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28, 32 (1927).
67. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221–22 (1960).
68. See supra Section I.B.
69. See id.
70. See King, supra note 46, at 511 (arguing that federal courts are finding a joint venture
“only when the United States actually seizes evidence during a foreign search or when U.S. conduct
makes the foreign seizure possible”).
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incentive to seek prosecution of high-value defendants in U.S. courts,
where they may be more likely to face severe penalties and serve their
sentences. Furthermore, the United States often encourages this practice for
these same reasons. But, it is precisely for these reasons—corrupting
influences and insufficient judicial oversight—that U.S. courts should be
particularly cautious when relying on evidence secured in foreign nations.
Likewise, many of the countries with whom we partner do not have or
have not historically had the same respect for human and civil rights. It is
not surprising, as transnational criminal actors are likely to go where the
rule of law is weaker and where they will have greater ability to act with
impunity. In these same communities, however, police may exercise an
undue influence over civilians and easily trample rights that we take for
granted.71 As a result, the consequences of unquestioningly relying on
foreign evidence in a U.S. trial are potentially far greater than relying on
evidence seized by state authorities.
Ultimately, the Elkins Court concluded that the only way to counter this
pressure was to impose equal standards on evidence obtained by law
71. Without intending to single out particular countries, it is useful to consider recent Human
Rights Watch and U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports for just a few of the countries with
which the United States frequently interacts to fight transnational crime. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: MEXICO 1 (2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_
material/mexico_2012.pdf (“Efforts to implement comprehensive reform of the criminal justice
system, which would address endemic problems such as torture to extract confessions, continued to
progress slowly in 2011, leaving in place a system rife with abuses. . . . While engaging in law
enforcement activities, the armed forces have committed serious human rights violations, including
killings, torture, and enforced disappearances. Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission has
issued detailed reports of nearly 90 cases since 2007 in which it found that members of the army
had committed serious human rights abuses, and it has received complaints of nearly 5,800
additional human rights violations from 2007 to October 2011.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD
REPORT 2012: GUATEMALA 2 (2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/
guatemala_2012.pdf (characterizing the police and the prosecutorial and judicial systems as
“[d]eficient and corrupt . . . [and] contribut[ing] to Guatemala’s alarmingly low prosecution rate”);
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: NICARAGUA 2–3
(2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160471.pdf (“Although the law prohibits
such practices, human rights and other NGOs received complaints that police frequently abused
suspects during arrest; often used excessive force, including beatings on body areas that do not
bruise easily; or engaged in degrading treatment that caused injuries to criminal suspects during
arrests.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: GHANA 1
(2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160124.pdf (“Human rights problems
included the following: use of excessive force by police, which resulted in deaths and
injuries; . . . prolonged pretrial detention; arbitrary arrest of journalists; [and] corruption in all
branches of government . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2011 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES: RUSSIA 1 (2011), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186609.pdf
(“Individuals who threatened powerful state or business interests were subjected to political
prosecution, as well as to harsh conditions of detention. The conditions of prisons constituted a
major violation of the human rights of many prisoners . . . . These conditions at times resulted in
death. The government did not take adequate steps to prosecute or punish most officials who
committed abuses, resulting in a climate of impunity.”).
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enforcement, regardless of whether officials acted for a state or federal
agency.72 This conclusion is one that we should adopt here.
II. APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
EXTRATERRITORIAL SEARCHES
As noted, courts uniformly reject the application of the Fourth
Amendment to extraterritorial searches unless the foreign government acts
at the behest of the United States and the victim has substantial
connections to the United States. Why courts should reconsider their
answers in light of twenty-first century cross-border investigations is
considered in more detail in these next sections.
The most comprehensive exegesis on the extraterritorial application of
the Fourth Amendment is found in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.73
The Court broke its analysis down into two key questions. First, who are
“the people” entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment? Second,
what is the scope of the harm the Fourth Amendment covers?
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court overturned the appellate court and held
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the search and seizure by U.S.
federal agents of a foreign defendant’s property located in a foreign
country.74 Rene Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican national living in Mexico,
was charged in a U.S. federal court with violating various U.S. federal
narcotics statutes.75 Mexican police arrested him in Mexico based on the
request of the United States and transferred him to U.S. custody so that he
could face these charges in the United States.76 After the defendant was
arrested, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents sought to search
his Mexican residences for evidence related to the charges VerdugoUrquidez faced in the United States.77 The DEA agents did not seek a
search warrant from an American court or even from a Mexican court.78
Instead, they obtained authorization for the search from the head of the
Mexican Federal Judicial Police.79 During the search they found evidence
that substantiated the U.S. charges.80 When the defendant moved to
suppress evidence obtained during the search and argued that the search
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, the district court granted
the motion and the appellate court affirmed and held that the Constitution
imposes constraints on the federal government when it acts abroad.81 A
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221–22.
494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Id. at 266–67, 275.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 262–63.
See id. at 262.
See id. at 262–63.
Id. at 263; see also Michael J. Bulzomi, Investigating International Terrorism Overseas:
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plurality82 of the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and reversed.83
The initial conclusion driving the Court’s rejection of VerdugoUrquidez’s claims was that as a foreign national who lived primarily in
Mexico, Verdugo-Urquidez was not one of “the people” who had a Fourth
Amendment right to be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”84 The Supreme Court
determined that Fourth Amendment protections extended only to those
defendants who are citizens or who have a “sufficient connection” to the
United States such that they are part of the community of the governed.85
Because Verdugo-Urquidez was not voluntarily a member of the American
community, he was insufficiently connected to the United States, said the
Court, so the Fourth Amendment could not protect him from the
overreaching of U.S. federal agents.86
The second conclusion that underpinned the Verdugo-Urquidez
decision was that the scope of the Fourth Amendment inquiry was limited
to the moment of the search itself. The Court distinguished a Fourth
Amendment violation from a “fundamental trial right” found in the Fifth
Amendment, and argued that a violation of the Fourth Amendment is
“‘fully accomplished’ at the time of an unreasonable governmental
intrusion.”87 Implicit in the Court’s reasoning was that the “unreasonable
governmental intrusion” ended when the search and seizure ended.
“Whether evidence . . . should be excluded at trial in the United States is a
remedial question separate from the existence vel non of the constitutional
violation.”88 Because it determined that there could not be a constitutional
violation for a search and seizure conducted in Mexico to an individual
Constitutional Considerations, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., July 2002, at 25, 27.
82. There is a discord between the federal courts and commentators in interpreting VerdugoUrquidez. See Bentley, supra note 6, at 361 n.137. The federal courts have interpreted Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion as a majority opinion since it nominally had the support of five justices. See
id.; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261 (noting that Justices Byron White, Sandra Day O’Connor,
Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy joined Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion).
However, numerous commentators have noted that Justice Kennedy, although joining Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion, wrote a concurring opinion fundamentally at odds with that opinion. Bentley,
supra note 6, at 343 & n.53. Although the commentators’ interpretation appears to be more
theoretically consistent, in the interest of practicality to litigators in the federal court system, this
Article will refer to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion as the majority opinion.
83. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cited in Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264–65.
85. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
86. Id. at 270–73.
87. Id. at 264 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) and United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)); see also Mary Lynn Nicholas, Comment, United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez: Restricting the Borders of the Fourth Amendment, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 267,
283 (1991) (noting that the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez stressed “that the place where an alleged
constitutional violation occurs is significant”).
88. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264 (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354).
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without a sufficient connection to the United States, the Court never
reached an answer to that remedial question.
A. (Re)Defining the Scope of the Unreasonable
Government Intrusion
Because the definition of “people” arguably depends on the scope of
the Fourth Amendment intrusion, the reassessment of the Verdugo opinion
should begin out of order—by looking first at the scope of the intrusion
before considering the definition of the word “people.”
As noted, the Court limited its consideration of the “unreasonable
governmental intrusion” to the search itself. Because the search itself took
place outside of the United States, where the Fourth Amendment had no
effect, there was no situation where the Fourth Amendment would apply.89
This initial conclusion is inconsistent with several key cases applying the
Fourth Amendment.90 In fact, the Court recognizes time and again that it is
the “use of the seized evidence” that denies “the constitutional rights of the
accused.”91 The evidence is not used until the defendant is charged, held,
convicted, or imprisoned. Each stage in the criminal process—and
particularly the criminal trial—creates one more opportunity for the
government to intrude into the defendant’s privacy. As the Court in Weeks
concluded:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to
be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be stricken from the Constitution.92

89. Given that the search was conducted by U.S. federal law enforcement, and the Fourth
Amendment provides limitations on the ability of U.S. federal law enforcement to act, there is a
good argument that the Fourth Amendment should have applied regardless of any subsequent U.S.
action. It is puzzling, at the very least, that the majority did not find that there was a joint venture.
Because the majority concluded that the defendant was not sufficiently connected to the United
States and did not have a right to Fourth Amendment protections in the first place, it never reached
the question of whether U.S. federal law enforcement acted within its appropriate scope. The
majority also did not answer the question of whether such a search of a U.S. citizen living abroad
would violate the Fourth Amendment. Presumably, however, it would have.
90. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 393, 398 (1914), overruled by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and Mapp,
367 U.S. 643).
91. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added) (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
92. 232 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added). Likewise, Justice Frank Murphy implied a similar
analysis in his dissent in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949): “[T]he enforcement of the
search and seizure clause in the ordinary case today [is] limited to three devices: judicial exclusion
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Concluding otherwise only amplifies the egregiousness of the government
intrusion caused by the initial search and seizure.93
Nonetheless, the Verdugo-Urquidez Court suggests that this limitation
is appropriate because the Fourth Amendment, unlike the Fifth
Amendment, is not a trial right.94 “A ‘trial right’ is a constitutional right
that attaches only in the criminal trial setting.”95 Yet, this characterization
does not compel the conclusion that “[t]he other type of constitutional
right,” the “freestanding civil liberty,” that “protects individuals generally
from government overreaching in a variety of non-trial settings”96 must
then ignore the government actions that occur at trial. Arguably, this
freestanding civil liberty, found in the Fourth Amendment, should be
broader—not narrower—than these more limited trial rights. Divorcing the
use of the unreasonably seized evidence by the government at trial from the
actual search and seizure is unnecessarily limiting and not required by the
Constitution.97 By using the term “trial right” to distinguish the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments from the Fourth Amendment, the plurality distracts us
from the real harms accomplished by the search and seizure.98
Likewise, the approach of the plurality in this case puts them at odds
with their own brethren as well as jurists in years past. At the outset,
“constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be

of the illegally obtained evidence; criminal prosecution of violators; and civil action against
violators in the action of trespass.” In reality, however, “there is but one alternative to the rule of
exclusion. That is no sanction at all.” Id. Justice Murphy acknowledged that the most significant
harm—the government intrusion on the individual’s liberty—attaches at the time the defendant is
faced with the illegally seized evidence at trial. See id.
93. Even the earliest of judicial opinions on the subject of the government’s authority to act
appear to support this conclusion. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803) (“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws,
and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy
for the violation of a vested legal right.”).
94. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).
95. Godsey, supra note 8, at 874 (emphasis added).
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. See Emmanuel Kojo Bentil, Note, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: The U.S. Supreme
Court’s Effort to Halt the Trade in Illegal Drugs, 15 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 511, 527 (1990)
(“By reading this provision in isolation, rather than in light of and in conjunction with the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, the Court gives aliens a right to a fair trial by conceding the applicability of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, while in the same motion effectively taking this right away.”).
98. This analysis is not to suggest that the Fourth Amendment may not warrant a greater
connection to the United States than the Fifth or Sixth Amendment. It may be that for the purposes
of determining a basis for a civil suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or a criminal action against the agents, the search itself,
conducted in a vacuum and without additional contact between the subject and the U.S.
government, would not sufficiently connect a foreign national to the United States. However, that
was not the whole story for Verdugo-Urquidez and is not the context in which this particular right
and the attendant harms come into play.
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liberally construed.”99 It follows that the right to privacy should be
considered in its entirety, and not at one brief moment in time without
regard for the government’s continued engagement with a defendant. In
fact, as argued later in this Article,100 the Court’s decision in Wolf v.
Colorado101 compels this conclusion.
For these reasons, courts should widen their aperture when they
consider whether there is a sufficiently “unreasonable government
intrusion” such that a defendant may claim Fourth Amendment protections.
If there is only a search and seizure of a foreign national’s property, and no
other conduct to establish a governing relationship between the United
States and that foreign national, the reasoning of Verdugo-Urquidez may
stand. If, however, the U.S. government expands its jurisdiction over a
foreign national such that it seeks to impose the enforcement of its
sovereign criminal laws upon him, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment should extend retroactively to the pretrial investigative
stage—essentially cloaking the foreign national “with constitutional
protection[s] after the fact, even though [he was] located outside of the
United States and thus [was] not initially protected by the Bill of Rights at
the time that the alleged constitutional violation occurred.”102 This
“backward looking” application of the Fourth Amendment is not unlike the
Courts’ Fifth Amendment analyses.103
B. Rethinking Who Constitutes the “People”
The Verdugo-Urquidez Court rejected the notion that the defendant’s
trial in U.S. court was sufficient to establish a “substantial connection” to
the United States.104 As a result, he could not seek the protections afforded
by the Fourth Amendment.105 The Court divined the Framers’ intent in
99. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), abrogated on other grounds by
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
100. See infra Section III.B.
101. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
102. Godsey, supra note 8, at 874. This position advances an idea that is both fundamentally at
odds with and a variation of the theme put forward by Godsey, who argued that trial rights such as
those protected by the Fifth Amendment invariably protect non-Americans abroad, while
freestanding civil liberties, such as those enshrined in the Fourth Amendment, do not. Godsey
accepts the Supreme Court’s rationale distinguishing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments from other
amendments without questioning it. But if we put aside the limitation the Court imposes and
Godsey accepts, his analysis of the way a court should view a Fifth Amendment violation (by
starting at trial and looking backwards to the moment of the compelled statement) is a useful way of
considering a Fourth Amendment violation as well.
103. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 283–84 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that where the “sufficient connection” is supplied by the government through
its investigation and attempts to hold the defendant accountable under U.S. criminal laws, “[the
defendant] is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment”).
104. Id. at 264, 271 (plurality opinion).
105. See id. at 274–75. The majority essentially adopted a variation of the view that the

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss6/6

22

Pope: Lawlessness Breeds Lawlessness: A Case for Applying the Fourth A

2013]

A CASE FOR APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO EXTRATERRITORIAL SEARCHES

1939

using the phrase “the people,” and argued that the Court should limit the
Fourth Amendment only to “a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with
this country to be considered part of that community.”106 To reach this
conclusion, the Court found nothing in the Constitution to suggest that the
Framers meant for its provisions to reach outside the United States.107 In
particular, the plurality relied on several examples in which the United
States took actions against foreign nationals without limiting its ability to
search and seize—citing as examples the “‘undeclared war’” with France
in 1798 and arrests of enemy aliens following World War II for war
crimes.108 The Court did not define what would constitute a “substantial
connection” but rejected the notion that a defendant could involuntarily
become a member of this community through arrest and trial by U.S.
authorities.109
Missing from the majority’s analysis is recognition of the evolution of
U.S. jurisdictional reach over the behavior of foreign nationals for law
enforcement purposes, even if the individual never stepped foot inside the
jurisdictional boundaries of the United States.110 The power of law
enforcement—as opposed to the military, for example—to exercise this
authority is strictly governed by the Constitution and more particularly, the
Fourth Amendment.111 Enforcing the public safety is at the heart of this
social contract and at the heart of the Constitution.112 More to the point, we
Constitution is a social contract limited to the American people and their government. See The
Supreme Court, 1989 Term—Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 280–81 (1990); see also
Roszell Dulany Hunter, IV, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution—
Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649, 651–53 (1986) (discussing the contract metaphor). The
majority maintained that a foreign national may have a basis for claiming the protections of the
Fifth or Sixth Amendment when tried in the United States.
106. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (citing U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279,
292 (1904)).
107. See id. at 266.
108. Id. at 267–69.
109. See id. at 271–72. Similarly, because the Framers used the “relatively universal term of
‘person’” in the Fifth Amendment but the Court “rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth
Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States,” the Court found that the
more restricted term “the people” as used in the Fourth Amendment clearly made the Fourth
Amendment inapplicable extraterritorially. See id. However, the Court suggested that a foreign
national tried within the United States may be able to make a claim of entitlement to Fifth
Amendment protections. Id. at 264.
110. See supra text accompanying note 4.
111. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1914) (stating that the “effect of the
Fourth Amendment” is to limit and restrain federal actors “in the exercise of their power and
authority”), overruled by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); see also Richard J. Dolan, Note, Aliens’ Fourth Amendment Rights Against
Government Searches Abroad: United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989), 64 WASH. L. REV. 701, 713–14 (1989).
112. See Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 41 (“[A] United States police officer . . . . has no power
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have no mechanism to enforce these extraterritorial federal statutes unless
we bring a defendant into our jurisdiction and subject them to our laws and
criminal procedures. If we are forcing a social contract with these hapless
figures, by searching their homes, by seizing their property, by forcing
them to stand trial for the impact of their actions in the United States, and
ultimately by imprisoning them in U.S. prisons, then it cannot follow that
we are exempt from our own rules governing law enforcement conduct.
This “enforcement of domestic criminal law” is the “paradigmatic exercise
of sovereignty over those who are compelled to obey.”113 For that reason,
courts should reject the reasoning of the Verdugo-Urquidez plurality. If a
person is tried in a U.S. court for violating a U.S. federal statute to face
possible imprisonment in a U.S. federal prison, courts should consider that
individual a member of “the people” and she should receive the benefits of
U.S. constitutional protections. Following any other path creates a parallel
set of standards that is wholly inconsistent with the “conception of human
rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of
English-speaking peoples.”114
III. APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AUTHORITIES
A. Applying the Fourth Amendment to Law Enforcement Acting
Outside the Territorial Boundaries of the United States
Even if the defendant is determined to be one of “the people” for
purposes of Fourth Amendment application, there is a second unresolved
question of whether law enforcement conduct—either by U.S. officials or
by foreign governments working with them—committed outside the
United States can violate the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court in
Reid v. Covert115 concluded that the Constitution limits U.S. law
enforcement conduct abroad.116 Although the Court in Reid did not itself
to compel anyone to do anything outside United States territory. The same is true of the United
States prosecutor . . . . A state can claim extraterritorial effect for its criminal laws but cannot
directly enforce those laws beyond its borders.”).
113. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (distinguishing these
circumstances from the government’s exercise of power abroad, which does not ordinarily implicate
the Fourth Amendment).
114. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
115. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
116. Id. at 5–6 (“At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts against
citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of the
Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the
limitations imposed by the Constitution.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 8–9 (“This Court and
other federal courts have held or asserted that various constitutional limitations apply to the
Government when it acts outside the continental United States. While it has been suggested that
only those constitutional rights which are ‘fundamental’ protect Americans abroad, we can find no
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specify whether the Constitution applies only to citizens or extends to
aliens,117 the Court reasoned that the government “can only act in
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.”118 Its
reasoning appears to go only to the question of the government’s authority
to act. Although the Court does not make the distinction, it could equally
be used to justify limiting governmental action against foreign nationals.119
In fact, as the Reid Court points out, the powers of law enforcement to
investigate, of judges to convict and sentence, and of officials to imprison
an individual, all derive from the Constitution; so, it seems incongruent to
use Reid for the proposition that the government is permitted to act outside
the Constitution in particular circumstances.120
Nonetheless, the Verdugo-Urquidez Court spent much time limiting the
holding of Reid, and suggested that courts should read Reid to apply only
to citizens—as opposed to “people” who are otherwise connected to the
United States—and only to the protections of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.121 Courts should limit the Fourth Amendment to conduct
inside the United States, argued the majority, because the Framers intended
to restrict only those searches and seizures that might be conducted by the
federal government in domestic matters.122
The Court’s rationale for limiting Reid should be reexamined and
rejected. At the outset, reliance on the original intent of the Framers does
not get us far. In 1789, the Framers could not contemplate the existence of
multiple powerful U.S. federal law enforcement agencies with attachés
stationed in hundreds of countries overseas enforcing U.S. laws.123
Likewise, there is no evidence to suggest that the Framers ever
warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking and choosing among the remarkable collection of ‘Thou
shalt nots’ which were explicitly fastened on all departments and agencies of the Federal
Government by the Constitution and its Amendments.” (footnotes omitted)).
117. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights
Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 23–24 (1985).
118. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5–6, quoted in Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
119. In fact, Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez does just that. See VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 12; see also Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 5–6); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 315–16 (1936); Dolan, supra note 111, at 713.
121. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269–70.
122. Id. at 266 (“What we know of the history of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment also
suggests that its purpose was to restrict searches and seizures which might be conducted by the
United States in domestic matters. The Framers originally decided not to include a provision like
the Fourth Amendment, because they believed the National Government lacked power to conduct
searches and seizures.” (citing CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 508–09
(1928); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (1789) (statement of James Madison))).
123. See supra note 64.
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contemplated that the U.S. federal government might seek to stretch its
long arms into the homes of foreign nationals for the purposes of
prosecuting them, or that the Framers considered and rejected the Fourth
Amendment’s application to such a scenario. It is not analogous to
consider the Framers’ views in the context of war, whether undeclared or
not, as the Court suggests, or in any other scenario involving conflicts
between sovereign nations.124 These are not situations where the United
States exercises its sovereign jurisdiction over a foreign national for which
that individual faces criminal penalties in an Article III court.
The situation described in Verdugo-Urquidez, unlike conflicts between
sovereign nations, epitomizes run-of-the-mill public safety violations,
typically investigated by traditional law enforcement agents—albeit where
the evidence and defendant are located outside the United States.125 It is
most logical, therefore, that we should approach this question from a law
enforcement perspective and rely on traditional law enforcement
guidelines.126
That the Verdugo-Urquidez Court’s holding was less than convincing
on this particular point is evidenced by the fact that lower courts in the
years since have continued to engage in a Fourth Amendment analysis of
evidence obtained overseas, particularly in the context of evidence seized
from U.S. citizens and often resident aliens abroad.127 In fact, lower courts
consistently hold that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard
applies to U.S. officials conducting a search affecting a U.S. citizen in a
124. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 267, 269, 273–75.
125. See Bentley, Jr., supra note 6, at 414–17 (distinguishing the national security concerns
identified by the majority in Verdugo-Urquidez from situations in which constitutional protections
are applied only to those whom the government treats as “the governed,” for example by
investigating and prosecuting them); see also Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 297 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (distinguishing between the government’s “exercise of power abroad [which] does not
ordinarily implicate the Fourth Amendment,” and “the enforcement of domestic criminal law[,
which] seems to me to be the paradigmatic exercise of sovereignty over those who are compelled to
obey”).
126. See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 912 (1991) (noting that
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on “‘history and case law’ as tending to show that nonresident
aliens have no constitutional rights against agents of the United States acting outside its borders”
mistakenly assumed “that examples drawn from two centuries of American constitutional history
could all be reconciled, and that the governing principles had not changed over this period. . . . The
principles determining the Constitution’s coverage have been sharply controverted during those two
hundred years, and different approaches have been dominant at different times. The authors of the
Bill of Rights almost certainly viewed everyone’s constitutional rights as territorially restricted by
the national boundaries; that view is utterly discredited today, and the question whether nonresident
aliens’ rights should continue to be so restricted cannot be answered by direct recourse to
eighteenth-century practice.” (footnote omitted)).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 968–69 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Adler, 605 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835–38
(W.D. Tex. 2009).
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foreign country.128 The far less clear conclusion is whether and when the
Fourth Amendment will reach the conduct of foreign law enforcement.
B. Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Conduct of Foreign Law
Enforcement Through the Due Process Clause
There is no question that our Constitution cannot bind the conduct of
foreign authorities. It is a very different question whether and when it binds
the conduct of U.S. authorities—whether it be the investigators, the
prosecutors, the judge, or the prison warden. It is also a different question
as to when constitutional protections attach to a foreign, nonresident
defendant. The point where these questions collide is determining the time
the defendant becomes subject to the full force of U.S. sovereignty. The
arrows all point to one conclusion: where the defendant is made a member
of the “people” because he faces charges for violating U.S. federal statutes
in the U.S. criminal justice system, and where the evidence seized is used
by federal prosecutors in a U.S. federal civilian court with the goal of
depriving the defendant of his liberty, courts should apply a reasonableness
standard to the admission of evidence, regardless of the country of origin
of that evidence.129
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wolf v. Colorado suggests that the
way to enforce the Fourth Amendment right to privacy for evidence used at
trial is through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.130 Prior to
Wolf, federal courts employed the silver platter doctrine based on their
understanding that the Fourth Amendment governed only the conduct of
federal investigators; state investigators were subject to their own
constitutional limitations.131 The power of the Court’s decision in Wolf was
its finding that “[t]he security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to
128. See, e.g., Juda, 46 F.3d at 968; Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490; Adler, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
129. Clearly, there is tension between our constitutional protections (for example, requirements
and methods for securing warrants) and foreign legal requirements, particularly where there is no
similar structure within the foreign government. As noted earlier, the questions of what is
“reasonable” and whether the reliance on foreign law is an appropriate standard for reasonableness
is best left for another time. For an interesting discussion of that topic, see Bentley, Jr., supra note
6, at 361–70.
130. Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (“We have already noticed the
intimate relation between the [Fourth and Fifth] [A]mendments. They throw great light on each
other. For the ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ condemned in the Fourth Amendment are
almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in
criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man ‘in a criminal case to
be a witness against himself,’ which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the
question as to what is an ‘unreasonable search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”), abrogated on other grounds by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967). See generally Miller, supra note 6, at 870–71.
131. See Nathan & Man, supra note 6, at 831 n.38.
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a free society.”132 These basic rights are rights that the federal courts must
enforce to ensure due process of law.133 Therefore, to ensure the protection
of this basic right of freedom—the right to be free from unreasonable
searches—courts must, through the power of the Due Process Clause,
equally apply the tenants of the Fourth Amendment in its review of state
searches, as well as federal searches.134
Explicit in the Wolf opinion is that the Due Process Clause prohibits an
American court from sanctioning a violation of this basic right. It is simply
inconsistent with our commitment to a free society. It is not a stretch to
import this same standard to searches conducted by foreign authorities
when the fruits of the search are used in an American court.135 If due
process is the basis for guarding this basic right to freedom against
intrusions by state actors, then due process should do the same to ensure
that any defendant—including a foreign defendant—tried in a U.S. court is
not deprived of life, liberty, or property based on an unreasonable
search.136 So concluding would remain consistent with the “living
principle” at the heart of the right articulated in Wolf and subsequent
cases.137
132. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
133. See id. at 27 (“Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow
requirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce
because they are basic to our free society.”).
134. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (holding that due process requires the
constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities considered fundamental or
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969))); Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d
723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures is to be read into the Fourteenth Amendment as a requirement of due process of law.”).
Note that the Wolf Court came to its conclusion because it found the right to protection from
unreasonable searches to be so basic to a free society that “were a State affirmatively to sanction
such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth
Amendment,” as opposed to any notion that the Fourteenth Amendment merely incorporated the
first eight amendments. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28.
135. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884) (assuming that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause has the same content as the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause); see Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 330 (2001) (arguing that the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments guarantee the same protections).
136. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 870–71; The Supreme Court, 1989 Term—Leading
Cases, supra note 105, at 276, 285. Alternatively, some of the considered harms could be mitigated
by significantly expanding the joint venture doctrine to apply more broadly to situations where a
U.S. prosecutor in a U.S. court relies on evidence seized in a foreign jurisdiction to deprive an
individual of his liberty. The conclusion could also meet some of the public policy goals otherwise
identified in this Article.
137. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27 (“[D]ue process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of
what may at a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights. To rely on a
tidy formula for the easy determination of what is a fundamental right for purposes of legal
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Courts flirted with this conclusion before and Justice Kennedy, in his
concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez, explicitly acknowledged, “All would
agree, for instance, that the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment protect the defendant.”138 Nonetheless, despite the reasoning
underpinning the Court’s decision in Wolf, courts consistently impose a
higher bar before they find that a foreign search violates the Due Process
Clause.139 Rather than looking to whether the search was “reasonable,”
they ask whether the search “shocked the conscience.”140 “Searches found
to violate the shock-the-conscience standard are extraordinary and typically
only include cases in which a defendant was physically coerced in order to
obtain evidence.”141 This high standard is inconsistent with that articulated
by the Supreme Court and was explicitly rejected when evaluating the
conduct of state law enforcement.142 “To the victim it matters not [who

enforcement may satisfy a longing for certainty but ignores the movements of a free society. It
belittles the scale of the conception of due process. The real clue to the problem confronting the
judiciary in the application of the Due Process Clause is not to ask where the line is once and for all
to be drawn but to recognize that it is for the Court to draw it by the gradual and empiric process of
‘inclusion and exclusion.’” (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877))); see The
Supreme Court, 1989 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 105, at 285 (suggesting that the Due
Process Clause “may be viewed as an effective approximation of a flexible fourth amendment
standard adapted to differing international expectations of reasonableness and applied with a view
toward separation of powers concerns”). Furthermore, even the Verdugo-Urquidez Court agreed
that the Fifth Amendment—which uses the term “person” versus “people”—may apply at the trial
of a foreign national in a U.S. court. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264
(1990).
138. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also
noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from egregious
violations of her basic human rights. See id. (noting that the question is “what process is due a
defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case” (quoting Reid v. Covert, 352 U.S. 1,
75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
139. See supra Section I.B.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 273 (2d Cir. 1974) (“This is conduct
that shocks the conscience.” (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169, 172–73 (1952)));
Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 745 (9th Cir. 1968); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d
775, 782 n.10 (5th Cir. 1965); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169, 172–73 (1952). As
discussed later, some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, hold that the fruits of a search that shock
the conscience are excluded under the authority of the court’s supervisory powers. See United
States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1995).
141. Mark Mermelstein, Searching Far & Wide, L.A. LAW., Nov. 2003, at 33, 38.
142. See Miller, supra note 6, at 896 (observing “that Rochin’s author, Justice Frankfurter,
clearly did not intend the doctrine to be limited to brutal law enforcement conduct”); see also Israel,
supra note 135, at 361–67 (discussing the evolution of the Due Process Clause as it applies to trial
rights); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521–38 (1884) (discussing the evolution of due
process); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1855) (noting that the Fifth Amendment “is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive
and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress [sic] free to
make any process ‘due process of law’”).
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invaded] his constitutional right . . . .”143 The interpretation offered by
modern courts offers scant protection against unreasonable searches and
scant protection of the Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment
principles.144
Fortunately, the Court recognizes that “basic rights do not become
petrified as of any one time . . . . It is of the very nature of a free society to
advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right.”145 As
previously detailed, U.S. investigations and prosecutions of transnational
crime expanded significantly in recent years and now form the basis of a
presidential strategy.146 The primary way to dismantle the corrosive impact
of transnational crime is for the United States to expand its jurisdictional
reach and to cultivate foreign law enforcement partnerships to enforce
these statutory prohibitions. For that reason, this Article proposes
expanding our understanding of the Due Process Clause’s application to
extraterritorial searches consistent with the case law. If a U.S. prosecutor in
a U.S. court relies on evidence seized in a foreign jurisdiction to deprive an
individual of his liberty, then courts should undertake a reasonableness
analysis. This approach would recognize “minimum, existing constitutional
protections to criminal defendants and institutional requirements of Article
III courts.”147 The conclusion likewise provides law enforcement with the
necessary bright lines to promote greater consistency and sustainability.
The practical impact of this idea is foreshadowed by past experience.
The success of state–federal task forces around the country in
comprehensively attacking pervasive criminal threats is now well
known.148 Even outside of the formal task force model, local police
143. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960); see also People v. Defore, 150 N.E.
585, 588 (N.Y. 1926) (“The professed object of the trespass rather than the official character of the
trespasser should test the rights of government.”).
144. See Miller, supra note 6, at 871–72; see also Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222 (“If . . . it is
understood that the fruit of an unlawful search by state agents will be inadmissible in a federal trial,
there can be no inducement to subterfuge and evasion with respect to Federal– cooperation in
criminal investigation. Instead, forthright cooperation under constitutional standards will be
promoted and fostered.”).
145. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); see also Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 530–31 (“The Constitution . . . was made for an
undefined and expanding future, and for a people gathered and to be gathered from many nations
and of many tongues.”).
146. See STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 1, at 3–4.
147. Miller, supra note 6, at 906.
148. For example, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) Program,
which was established in 1982 and combines federal, state, and local law enforcement, “is the
centerpiece of the United States Attorney General’s drug strategy to reduce the availability of drugs
by disrupting and dismantling major drug trafficking organizations and money laundering
organizations and related criminal enterprises.” , U.S. DEP’T JUST., ORGANIZED CRIME DRUG
ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCES, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/taskforces/ocdetf.html (last visited
Oct. 13, 2013).
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officers often will bring their cases to assistant U.S. attorneys to prosecute
for a variety of reasons, including the ability to get stronger sentences in
federal versus state courts. There are even model programs based on this
concept—for example, Project Exile, initiated in 1997 in Richmond, VA,
is credited with significantly lowering the violent crime in that city.149
There, the U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed to prosecute local firearms cases
in federal court so as to take repeat offenders off the streets for long
periods of time.150 And, as a result of the Court’s decisions in Wolf and
Elkins, if a defendant argues that the local police officer violated his due
process rights by committing an unlawful search or seizure, U.S. federal
courts immediately turn to the question of reasonableness. There is no
discussion as to the extent of the participation of the state with federal
government actors.
In these cases, law enforcement realizes a benefit from its ability to
bring the case in federal court—for example, because investigators can
connect the defendant into a larger-scale, multijurisdictional conspiracy, or
because the defendant will almost definitely face more significant and
certain sentencing penalties.151 But this benefit comes with the attendant
responsibilities. The fact that a city or state police officer conducted the
investigation does not let the federal government off the constitutional
hook. In fact, the difference in standards leads to a sometimes painful
change in investigative practices for local police, as the federal district
courts often impose more exacting scrutiny on the investigative practices.
But ultimately, no one argues that increasing these standards leads to fewer
convictions.152 The benefits of this cooperative model far outweigh the
additional care law enforcement must bring to their investigations. And, in
the end, requiring law enforcement to meet a more exacting bar arguably
enhances public trust and confidence in law enforcement.153
149. See, e.g., Project Exile: A Case Study in Successful Gun Law Enforcement: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, & Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t
Reform, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) (introductory remarks).
150. See id. at 173–76.
151. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. John L. Mica, Chairman, Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, & Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform) (“The advantage of Federal prosecutions
include [sic] stiff bond rules and tough sentences, including minimum mandatory sentences.”).
152. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960) (noting that “[e]mpirical statistics
are not available” to prove the impact of the exclusionary rule on states, “[b]ut pragmatic evidence
of a sort is not wanting . . . . [I]t has not been suggested either that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has thereby been rendered ineffective, or that the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts has thereby been disrupted”).
153. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler, & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at a
Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 335, 363 (2011) (“[I]n virtually every context studied to date, law enforcement
effectiveness has displayed at best only a weak influence on perceived legitimacy, while procedural
justice concerns are strongly linked to legitimacy, voluntary compliance, and willingness to
cooperate.”).
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Federal–foreign law enforcement relationships are not significantly
different from federal–state partnerships. Government officials are moving
(or have moved) toward situations where they are working more
cooperatively to take down a criminal network. In the best examples, law
enforcement shares common targets, evidence, and information, and
ultimately brings appropriate enforcement actions in the country that has
the best tools available based on the evidence.154 This fluid exchange of
information and resources is a positive development in terms of combating
transnational crime. But it should not come at the price of sacrificing
fundamental civil liberties or tumbling down to the lowest common
denominator of police practice. As in the state–federal task force practice,
if law enforcement realizes a benefit from its ability to choose the best
forum to seek prosecution of a case, then the choice of a U.S. federal
district court should come with the attendant responsibilities.
C. If the Search Is Not Reasonable, Exclusion Is the
Appropriate Remedy
Regardless of the standard used, courts consistently advocate against
exclusion of foreign evidence because they perceive no deterrent effect.155
This final section questions that premise in light of changing law
enforcement practices and offers a second basis for excluding unreasonably
seized evidence: preservation of judicial integrity.156
1. Deterrence
In Weeks v. United States,157 the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search
154. See Amy E. Pope, Partnering with Mexico: What Human Trafficking Cases Can Teach
Us Moving Forward, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2012, at 18, 19–20; Border Enforcement Security Task
Force (BEST), U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/best (last visited Oct.
13, 2013) (“On our country’s northern border, Canadian law enforcement agencies like the Canada
Border Services Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, the
Niagara Regional Police Service, the Toronto Metropolitan Police, the Windsor Police Service and
the Amherstburg Police Service are active members. On the southwest border, the Mexican
Secretariat of Public Safety or SSP, and the Colombian National Police have both been active
partners in the past, with both the BEST San Diego and BEST San Juan units.”).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1361–62 (9th Cir. 1978) (“An underlying
reason [for not applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to foreign searches by foreign
officials] is the doubtful deterrent effect on foreign police practices that might follow from a
punitive exclusion of the evidence by an American court.” (citing Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d
345, 348 (9th Cir. 1967))); cf. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (“Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to
disregard it.”).
156. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
157. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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and seizure in a federal prosecution.158 The Court reasoned that “[t]he
effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States
and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority.”159
Not only should courts not perpetuate violations of the Fourth Amendment
by using the fruits of these unlawful searches, but if the fruits can “be
seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . is of no value,
and . . . might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”160 In short,
exclusion is the “only viable remedy available for most Fourth Amendment
violations” and without exclusion there is “no real right at all.”161
Courts are clear that their primary reason for excluding evidence seized
in an unlawful search is to discourage repeat violations.162 If law
enforcement cannot benefit from its unlawful conduct, then it will take care
to play by the rules in the future. In fact, scholars argue that in recent years,
“the conservative majority on the Supreme Court has increasingly
emphasized deterrence as the sole justification for excluding evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”163 For example, in United
States v. Leon,164 the Court found that, because the police officer acted in
good faith, his reliance on a search warrant later determined to be invalid
did not require exclusion of the unlawfully seized evidence.165 A court
essentially applies a “balancing test,” weighing the deterrence of the
officer’s behavior versus the impediment to “the truth-finding functions of
judge and jury.”166 If the deterrence value is low or nonexistent, a court
will lean in favor of preserving the evidence.167
When courts consider whether to exclude evidence gathered in a
foreign jurisdiction they immediately conclude that the “actions of an
American court are unlikely to influence the conduct of foreign police.”168
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 398.
Id. at 391–92.
Id. at 393.
Taslitz, supra note 14, at 423; see also supra text accompanying note 160.
See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
Cammack, supra note 11, at 645 (emphasis added); see also JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ,
CONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSION: THE RULES, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES THAT STRIKE THE BALANCE
BETWEEN FREEDOM AND ORDER 20–25 (2011) (discussing generally the exclusionary rule and
noting the Supreme Court’s recent shift in justifying the rule solely on the basis of deterrence).
164. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
165. Id. at 926; accord Cammack, supra note 11, at 646.
166. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (noting “[t]he balancing process implicit” in deciding whether to apply the
exclusionary rule).
167. See, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (restricting application of the exclusionary rule to
instances where the deterrence purpose is “most efficaciously served” and balancing the benefit of
deterrence against the cost of suppressing reliable evidence).
168. United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 1983); accord, e.g., United States v.
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The idea is so often repeated that it has become “well established.”169 It
may also explain why courts have so narrowly interpreted the joint venture
doctrine when examining evidence collected abroad.170 If there is no real
deterrence, then why find a joint venture that could potentially lead to
exclusion? The courts that simply repeat this conclusion without an
independent assessment, however, demonstrate a lack of understanding of
the evolving relationship between U.S. and foreign law enforcement.
Experience suggests that it is worth a court taking the time to probe the
question of whether exclusion could indeed provide meaningful deterrence
to law enforcement acting outside the United States.171 As previously
detailed, U.S. federal and foreign government actors frequently attack a
criminal network from many different fronts. They often combine efforts
and take advantage of the severity and certainty of sentencing found in
U.S. federal courts. Thus, to the extent that foreign law enforcement agents
have an interest in securing a conviction in a U.S. federal court, as opposed
to their local courts, these exclusionary rules will deter them. To the extent
they do not care and are happy to pursue prosecution (or not) in their local
courts, then they are governed by their own standards.
Most importantly, however, application of the exclusionary rule deters
U.S. law enforcement from using foreign partners to engage in searches
that offend the U.S. Constitution.172 As noted earlier, the power of the U.S.
agent is largely nonexistent outside of the territorial boundaries of the

Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The exclusionary rule is intended to inculcate a respect
for the Constitution in the police of our own nation. Since it has little if any deterrent effect upon
foreign police, it is seldom used to bar their work product.” (citations omitted)).
169. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455–56 n.31 (1976) (“It is well established, of
course, that the exclusionary rule, as a deterrent sanction, is not applicable where a private party or
a foreign government commits the offending act.”).
170. As the courts move further away from applying the exclusionary rule to preserve judicial
integrity and closer to looking to how it will deter police action, see Robert M. Bloom & David H.
Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the
Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 49 (2010), courts will be unlikely to extend the reach
of the Fourth Amendment absent evidence of a deterrent impact on the foreign actors.
171. This question obviously begs another: whether the exclusionary rule meaningfully deters
law enforcement violations of the Fourth Amendment for law enforcement acting within the United
States. Not all scholars agree that it does. See, e.g., Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect
Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
315, 331 (2004) (finding that thirty percent of the searches conducted by police violated the Fourth
Amendment); David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—Or Replace—
The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 149 (2009) (“But even if the
exclusionary rule remains in place, recently published empirical findings [suggest that] roughly a
third of all search and seizure activity violates the Fourth Amendment.”); Taslitz, supra note 14, at
419–20.
172. Cf. Street, supra note 45, at 459 (arguing that a broader interpretation of the joint venture
exception “may . . . deter the United States from collaborating . . . with law enforcement forces
known to bend their rules”).
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United States.173 U.S. law enforcement must depend on partner nations to
effectively enforce U.S. laws with extraterritorial application or where
evidence must otherwise be found extraterritorially.174 Furthermore, using
traditional methods of securing this evidence can prove incredibly slow
and cumbersome.175 U.S. law enforcement has a far better likelihood of
securing the information and evidence they need by building informal
partnerships with their foreign law enforcement counterparts. Because U.S.
law enforcement will not want to risk the exclusion of evidence, they will
be less likely to “tacitly . . . encourage [foreign] officers in the disregard of
constitutionally protected freedom[s]” to gain a tactical advantage.176 And,
ideally, by risking exclusion of evidence, U.S. federal law enforcement will
be encouraged in the other direction—to take greater care to teach and
promote methods of collecting evidence that will withstand scrutiny in
U.S. federal courts.
Again, this conclusion is not unrealistic. State–federal experience
demonstrates that state law enforcement will, for the benefit of gaining the
advantage of a federal prosecution under the federal sentencing guidelines,
adhere to the more rigorous standards often found in federal courts. There
is no reason to think that foreign police officers would be unwilling to do
the same if the outcome was to their benefit. Likewise, foreign law
enforcement already shows willingness to learn U.S. investigative
methods, including the use of forensics and preserving appropriate chain of
custody for evidence, not only for their own investigations, but also to aid
in preserving evidence that can be used in a U.S. prosecution.177 Teaching
the principles of probable cause, for example, is part and parcel of the
same lesson.
2. Preserving the Integrity of U.S. Courts
Despite the tendencies of a conservative Supreme Court in recent years
to emphasize deterrence as the overriding basis for the exclusionary rule,
we should not ignore the “imperative of judicial integrity” as a valid
rationale for its use.178 The Fourth Amendment does not just limit the
173. Nadelmann, supra note 4, at 74 (“[T]he law enforcement official . . . is rendered largely
powerless once he steps beyond his state’s borders.”).
174. Id. (“The result is that governments increasingly depend upon one another for the
effective enforcement of their laws.”).
175. See Pope, supra note 154, at 21 (“Treaties can slow pace of cooperative procedures.”).
See generally NADELMANN, supra note 63, at 313–96 (international evidence gathering).
176. Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221–22 (1960); see United States v. PaterninaVergara,749 F.2d 993, 997–98 (2d Cir. 1984).
177. Cf. NADELMANN, supra note 63, at 396 (“[W]hat began during the 1970s as a U.S. effort
to persuade foreign governments to accommodate the evidentiary needs of its judicial system
evolved during the 1980s into a far broader and more ambitious effort to bring foreign laws into
greater accordance with U.S. laws.”).
178. For a far more detailed discussion of this topic, see Taslitz, supra note 14.
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police. It limits all government actors. Thus, courts have just as much
responsibility—if not more—to ensure respect for a defendant’s
constitutional rights.179 As the Court acknowledged in McNabb v. United
States,180 “[A] conviction resting on evidence secured through such a
flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot
be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in
willful disobedience of law.”181 Courts should not be unthinking tools of
foreign governments or law enforcement agents that do not share our
respect for civil liberties and human rights. Rather, “judges [should] act as
a beacon or a symbol to society for ensuring lawful acts by the forces of
government.”182
But it is not enough for courts simply to admonish overreaching police
actors. Without some significant penalty, this protection is only
symbolic.183 This is particularly true in the context of foreign law
enforcement. Because courts have no other power to punish foreign law
enforcement for their bad acts,184 the only place for courts to set limits on
the actions of foreign government actors is within the context of the
criminal proceeding taking place in their own courtrooms. Therefore, the
primary way for courts to promote respect for these constitutional values is
179. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952) (noting that Article III of the U.S.
Constitution safeguards the independence of judges who must interpret “[d]ue process of law” in
light of evolving time and thought).
180. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
181. Id. at 345; see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (“The tendency of
those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful
seizures . . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times
with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for
the maintenance of such fundamental rights.”), overruled by Elkins, 364 U.S. 206, and Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
182. Robert M. Bloom, Judicial Integrity: A Call for Its Re-Emergence in the Adjudication of
Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 462, 464 (1993); see also Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 148–57 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not allow
law enforcement officers to circumvent the Fourth Amendment merely because they did not
deliberately violate the Fourth Amendment, but only did so negligently); Bloom & Fentin, supra
note 170, at 72 (“Like the vestals of ancient Rome, judges in the United States are honored for a
hallowed duty, which is to administer justice in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution.”).
183. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1684 (1992) (“[A] decision not to punish
wrongdoers . . . is . . . expressive: it communicates to the victim and to the wider society the idea
that such treatment, and the status it attributes the victim, are appropriate . . . .” (emphasis added)).
184. For example, the federal criminal civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006), is explicitly
limited to violations that occur inside the United States. Section 242 reads, in part: “Whoever,
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in
any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . .”
Id. (emphasis added). Because it does not have extraterritorial application, there is no chance that a
foreign police officer could be prosecuted for violating a defendant’s civil rights.
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to keep law enforcement—domestic and foreign—from profiting from
violations.
Finally, exclusion of unreasonably seized foreign evidence is necessary
to “minimiz[e] the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government.”185 To preserve democratic legitimacy, the actions of the
court must be broadly consistent with the rule of law.186 Fostering a double
standard in the treatment of individuals held to account before a court can
only weaken the perceived legitimacy of our courts—a high price to pay in
the name of law enforcement.
The fact that the courts are not wholly immune to the concept of
judicial integrity is evidenced by the willingness of courts to exclude
evidence “if the circumstances of the foreign search and seizure are so
extreme that they shock the [judicial] conscience, [so that] a federal
appellate court in the exercise of its supervisory powers can require
exclusion of the evidence.”187 “This type of exclusion is not based on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but rather on the recognition that
[courts] may employ [their] supervisory powers when absolutely necessary
to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system.”188 This factintensive inquiry by the courts provides a base level of protection in courts
that is not called into question by those who advocate against exclusion.189
But while an allegation of torture, for example, may provoke an inquiry
into the means law enforcement used to obtain evidence, unless
conscience-shocking tactics are substantiated, it is by no means a guarantee
that the court will exclude the evidence even if the conduct may not have
been “reasonable.”190 Likewise, courts are willing to overlook conscience185. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (“A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize,
has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an
application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.”); Yale Kamisar, Does
(Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather Than an “Empirical
Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 604 (1983) (noting that a principal reason supporting
the exclusionary rule is that “the Court’s aid should be denied ‘in order to maintain respect for law
[and] to preserve the judicial process from contamination’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))).
186. See Schulhofer et al., supra note 153, at 363.
187. United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1995) (alterations in original)
(quoting United States v. LaChapelle, 869 F.2d 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
188. Id.
189. See United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Birdsell v. United
States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n.10 (5th Cir. 1965)); U.S. ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65–66
(2d Cir. 1975) (citing United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974)); United States
v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585, 587 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970) (offering, in dicta, rubbing pepper in a suspect’s
eyes as a hypothetical example of shocking conduct).
190. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 123–24, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
not excluding a confession was not in error where claims of torture contradicted the record: the
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shocking conduct and admit evidence if recovery of the evidence was
sufficiently “attenuated” from the misconduct.191
The happy news is that this line of cases suggests that the commitment
to preserving judicial integrity is not dead. The less happy news is that
courts are willing to tolerate unreasonable law enforcement conduct as
long as it does not shock the conscience. But this does not have to be the
end of the inquiry. As they did when they reconsidered the admission of
evidence unreasonably seized by state law enforcement, courts must now
once again “close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right.”192
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez:
By respecting the rights of foreign nationals, we encourage
other nations to respect the rights of our citizens. Moreover,
as our Nation becomes increasingly concerned about the
domestic effects of international crime, we cannot forget that
the behavior of our law enforcement agents abroad sends a
powerful message about the rule of law to individuals
everywhere.193
The time has come for the United States to hold its own courts, law
enforcement, juries, and prosecutors to the same standard—we should not
tolerate the use of ill-gotten gains no matter its source.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, as federal investigators increasingly blur traditional
jurisdictional lines to attack powerful transnational criminal networks, they
should not do so without regard for the Constitution. While we cannot
force foreign actors to behave in ways that comply with our constitutional
standards, the decisions of our courts can strongly influence them.
Furthermore, the Due Process Clause requires that U.S. courts protect this
most basic right—specifically, the right to be free from unwarranted police
intrusion. Although imposing a higher standard may initially appear
burdensome, in doing so, we are actually promoting a more powerful
defendant denied he had injuries in a medical report on a U.S. plane, the defendant never
complained to agents of his injuries, nothing in the record from the foreign government’s custody
indicated torture, there was no permanent scarring, and some of the positions alleged by defendant
were physically impossible).
191. Courts cite factors that demonstrate attenuation that include a lapse in time, change in
circumstance, adequate advisement of rights or a “break in the stream of events” after the coercion.
See, e.g., Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1050–51 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a six-hour
lapse, new location, new warnings, and new interrogators constituted a sufficient break in the
stream of events to admit evidence in a Fifth Amendment case).
192. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961).
193. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 285 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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mechanism to attack transnational criminal actors. In fact, the evidence
suggests that those countries with the least respect for civil liberties also
have high rates of corruption. The lack of transparency goes both ways and
ultimately empowers criminal actors.194 Thus, highly functioning,
transparent civilian institutions around the globe go hand in hand with
ending impunity for criminal actors.
The lesson here is that the most effective path forward is one that raises
the standards for police conduct without meaningfully undermining law
enforcement’s ability to hold wrongdoers accountable for their crimes. We
should learn from the historical lessons taught by our experience with
federal–state partnerships and banish the false distinctions we built
between U.S. and foreign law enforcement. “If we seek respect for law and
order, we must observe these principles ourselves. Lawlessness breeds
lawlessness.”195

194. See Schulhofer et al., supra note 186, at 350–51; Taslitz, supra note 14, at 470
(“Procedural justice by the police is also likely to be more effective in deterring and successfully
investigating crime than is militaristic policing, though harsh policing methods can sometimes
promote a grudging and resentful citizen compliance with the law—while lacking the benefit of
promoting citizen cooperation with law enforcement.”).
195. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 285 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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